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I. Introduction

The Supreme Court’s decision in the “Bridgegate”1
controversy has been the subject of intense debate. It has
received strong support.2 However, some critics assail the
decision as representative of a pattern of recent cases in which
the Court has shown itself as indifferent to political corruption,
if not supportive of it.3 Somewhat lost in the discussion is the
decision’s potential to be the foundation for a seismic
re-alignment of anti-corruption enforcement in the United
States. The current model—with federal prosecution as the
norm—is not cast in stone.
The facts of Bridgegate are well known. In 2015, associates
of then Governor Chris Christie (Republican, New Jersey)
executed a plan to alter access to the George Washington
Bridge—the busiest motor bridge in the world. The plan
involved reducing access lanes to the Bridge from Fort Lee, New
Jersey. The result was gridlock and chaos in Fort Lee. The
schemers wanted to punish the mayor of that town for not
supporting the Governor’s re-election. The result was a disaster
for them on many fronts.4 The United States Attorney for New

1. Kelly v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1565 (2020). In this article, Kelly
will refer to the actual decision, while Bridgegate will refer to the defendants’
conduct, and to the ensuing controversy.
2. See Randall D. Eliason, Opinion, On ‘Bridgegate,’ the Supreme Court
Got It Right, WASH. POST (May 7, 2020, 8:54 PM), https://perma.cc/RR4VMS8S; Corinne Ramey, Was ‘Bridgegate’ Criminal, or Just Dirty Politics?,
WALL ST. J. (June 30, 2019), https://perma.cc/4BPS-PPPC.
3. E.g., Elie Mystal, The Supreme Court Has Given Its Blessing to Public
Corruption, THE NATION (May 14, 2020), https://perma.cc/P8SQ-NBYK; Leah
Litman, Opinion, Prosecuting Political Corruption Cases Like Bridgegate Is
Nearly Impossible, WASH. POST (May 8, 2020), https://perma.cc/4FFE-CHRE
[hereinafter Litman Op-Ed]; Ian Millhiser, The Supreme Court’s “Bridgegate”
Decision Leaves a Big Hole in America’s Anti-Corruption Laws, VOX (May 7,
2020, 12:50 PM), https://perma.cc/XP6Q-6LPU.
4. They lost their jobs (two of them resigned). Christie was not directly
implicated, but his public image suffered. See, e.g., Aaron Blake, The 9 Things
You Need to Know About Bridgegate, WASH. POST (May 1, 2015), https://
perma.cc/K5E7-5UBB (“And while he has not been implicated in any
wrongdoing, Christie’s approval rating in New Jersey continues to drop to this
day—so much so that his 2016 presidential aspirations seem pretty dim.”).
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Jersey prosecuted them for violation of federal fraud statutes.5
Their convictions were upheld at both the district and appellate
court level.6 In May of 2020, however, a unanimous Supreme
Court reversed, vacating the convictions.7
Justice Kagan’s opinion for the Court analyzed the
concept of fraud as embodied in the relevant statutes. She
reasoned that they required that the defendants have obtained
money and property from the owner of the Bridge: the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey.8 She viewed the lane
realignment as a regulatory decision that did not involve the
required gain or loss of property. The defendants had lied to Port
Authority employees and the public to facilitate the scheme.
Their conduct may have been fraudulent, even “corrupt,” but it
did not constitute a violation of federal law.9
Early criticisms have not focused much on the fine points
of the decision such as the proprietary/regulation distinction, or
the question of whether and to what extent private gain is
required in such cases. Instead, they have attacked the decision
as part of the Roberts Court’s softness on corruption.10 They rely
heavily on campaign finance decisions such as Citizens United
v. Federal Election Commission,11 as well as the body of
Supreme Court decisions on ordinary corruption. The issue of

5. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 666, 1343 (2018). The charges included substantive
violations and conspiracy to violate. There was also an allegation of violation
of the Criminal Civil Rights statute, Id. § 242.
6. See United States v. Baroni, 909 F.3d 550, 558–60 (3d Cir. 2018);
United States. v. Baroni, No. 2:15-CR-00193-SDW-1, 2017 WL 1233892, at *1
(D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2017).
7. See Kelly, 140 S. Ct. at 1574 (vacating and remanding).
8. See id. at 1568–69.
9. See id. at 1568 (“The evidence the jury heard no doubt shows
wrongdoing—deception, corruption, abuse of power. But the federal fraud
statutes at issue do not criminalize all such conduct.”).
10. See, e.g., Litman Op-Ed, supra note 3; c.f. Zephyr Teachout
(@ZephyrTeachout), TWITTER (May 7, 2020, 1:10 PM), https://perma.cc/A8M228PJ [hereinafter Teachout tweet] (“The case still fits within a pattern of the
Court striking down key prosecutorial tools in the anticorruption fight but it
was a relatively novel theory being used, and I think the real impact on
prosecutions will be less than other cases.”).
11. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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whether to analyze these decisions together is important.12
Citizens United played no role in Kelly v. United States.13 It
should not escape even the casual observer that the first group
of cases have been split along ideological lines, while the second
group are almost always unanimous. It is virtually
inconceivable that the liberal justices would abandon their
position on how to deal with corruption in one set of cases but
not the other. The notion of a monolithic Roberts Court
approach to all issues of corruption seems simplistic.
Focus on the Roberts Court’s purported general approach
to corruption may lead to insufficient attention to a specific
aspect of Justice Kagan’s opinion: the emphasis on federalism
as a driving force behind the result. It is true that in other
corruption decisions favoring the defendant, the Court has often
invoked federalism.14 However, the concept is much more
central in Kelly. The American model of anti-corruption
enforcement has long been debated.15 Under the present model,
the federal government plays the lead role in combating state
and local corruption, particularly in high profile cases.16 This
division of authority is not inevitable. After Kelly, a
re-alignment seems possible. States have statutes on point and
mechanisms to enforce them.17 Moreover, reconsideration of the
federal role would come at a time when the allocation of
12. See, e.g., Jacob Eisler, McDonnell and Anti-Corruption’s Last Stand,
50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1619, 1626–27 (2017); see generally Joshua S. Sellers,
Contributions, Bribes, and the Convergence of Political and Criminal
Corruption, 45 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 657 (2018).
13. 140 S. Ct. 1565 (2020).
14. E.g., McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 359–61 (1987).
15. Compare Peter J. Henning, Federalism and the Federal Prosecution
of State and Local Corruption, 92 KY. L.J. 75, 144 (2003),) with Geraldine S.
Moohr, Mail Fraud and the Intangible Rights Doctrine: Someone to Watch
Over Us, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 153, 207–08 (1994).
16. These cases set the tone for the entire field.
17. For example, the New Jersey statute on “unauthorized exercise of
official functions,” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:30-2 (West 2016), was cited in Kelly,
140 S. Ct. at 1571. The Louisiana laws on video poker licenses were cited by
the Court in Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 15 (2000) (citing LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 27:301–:324 (West Supp. 2000)). And many states have ethics
commissions. See generally COUNCIL ON GOVERNMENTAL ETHICS LAWS, https://
perma.cc/4G4U-59NM; State Ethics Commissions: Jurisdiction, NAT’L CONF.
ON ST. LEGISLATURES (Aug. 21, 2020), https://perma.cc/PNP7-8Y2J.
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responsibilities between the two levels of government seems up
for grabs, with frequent calls for greater state responsibility.
From partisan gerrymandering to immigration to police reform,
there are stirrings of a “new federalism.” After Kelly, one must
consider what a new anti-corruption federalism might look like.
Section I of the article sets out the legal context and the
alarming facts of Bridgegate. Section II examines the
Bridgegate legal saga from the indictment through the decision
in the lower courts. Although its outcome almost always favored
the prosecution, the shape of the case changed considerably
during its journey to the Supreme Court, an indication, perhaps,
of its difficulty. Section III examines the High Court's decision
in Kelly. It considers both the Court's approach to the concept of
fraud in the relevant statutes, and its emphasis on federalism
concerns in construing them. Section IV weighs possible impacts
of Kelly, both on future prosecutions under the existing model,
and on that model itself. It revisits the criticisms of the Roberts
Court, and contends that the unified vision of the Court’s
approach to corruption breaks down when one examines
differing legal contexts and doctrines. The First Amendment
plays a dominant role in campaign finance matters, but is
largely absent from ordinary corruption cases. Federalism has
nothing to do with campaign finance. It has a lot to do with
anti-corruption enforcement.
II. Bridgegate: Alarming Facts and Uncertain Legal Context
A. The Facts: “Time for Some Traffic Problems in Fort Lee.”
In his 2013 re-election campaign, Republican New Jersey
Governor Chris Christie sought the endorsement of multiple
Democratic mayors of New Jersey towns to show bi-partisan
support. He deployed his Deputy Chief of Staff, Bridget Kelly,
to court the mayors for their endorsement, including the Mayor
of Fort Lee, Mark Sokolich.18 Mayor Sokolich declined to
endorse Christie that summer.
Since Fort Lee connects New Jersey to New York via the
George Washington Bridge, Kelly reached out to William
18. This recital of the facts is drawn from the decisions of the Supreme
Court and the Third Circuit. See Kelly, 140 S. Ct. at 1568–71; United States v.
Baroni, 909 F.3d 550, 558–60 (3d Cir. 2018).
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Baroni, the Deputy Executive Director of the Port Authority of
New York and New Jersey and the highest ranking New Jersey
official in the bi-state agency, and David Wildstein, who
functioned as Baroni’s chief of staff, for suggestions on how to
respond. As a result of a decades old political agreement, three
of the twelve toll booth lanes on the Bridge’s upper level feed
from local Fort Lee traffic, while the remaining nine lanes feed
from various highways. Wildstein suggested that removing the
dedicated Fort Lee lanes would cause rush hour traffic to back
up for hours on local streets, creating a gridlock. The plan was
later revised to allocate only one lane to Fort Lee traffic. Kelly
agreed in a now famous email: “Time for some traffic problems
in Fort Lee.” Kelly followed up in a phone call that she wanted
to “‘creat[e] a traffic jam that would punish Mayor Sokolich and
‘send him a message.’” Baroni, using his power as the Deputy
Director, gave the sign-off approving the plan. The prosecution
framed this as obtaining property; the defense claimed it was a
use of regulatory power.
Baroni did not have the power to reallocate the lanes
arbitrarily. To put the plan in motion, Kelly, Baroni, and
Wildstein created a cover story that “the lane change was part
of a traffic study, intended to assess whether to retain the
dedicated Fort Lee lanes in the future.”
In order to effectuate the scheme, Kelly, Baroni, and
Wildstein agreed to incur the cost of extra toll collectors. On
September 9, 2013, the plan went into effect on the first day of
school, without warning or advance notice to Mayor Sokolich or
Executive Director of the Port Authority, Patrick Foye. The
town of Fort Lee was engulfed in gridlock, with chaos and traffic
rivaling September 11, 2001. Mayor Sokolich’s repeated
attempts to reach Baroni were met with radio silence, which
was part of the schemers’ communication plan. The realignment
scheme lasted five days.
The public backlash was “swift and severe.”19 Port
Authority staff were asked to testify before the New Jersey
State Assembly. In the following months, Wildstein and Baroni
resigned and Governor Christie fired Kelly. On April 23, 2015,
a federal grand jury returned an indictment charging
defendants with violations of federal law. While Governor
19.

Kelly, 140 S. Ct. at 1571.
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Christie won re-election, his national reputation never
recovered.
B. The Legal Context
1. Views of Corruption
The conduct outlined above certainly qualifies as
bare-knuckle politics.20 But two key questions arise: is it
corruption; and, is it the type of corruption reached by federal
law? A narrow view of corruption focuses on private gain though
public office. As Jacob Eisler puts it, “[t]he law of corruption
identifies when public officials betray their office for the sake of
self-enrichment.”21 However, his analysis points to a broader
framework:
Corruption is . . . intimately related to positive duties of
government. Corruption can be understood as deviation from
political integrity (itself informed by deep concepts such as
sovereign legitimacy and the right to use the collective power of the
state), and a particular corrupt act can be understood as the
violation of a political duty.22

Professor Teachout sees the debate over the meaning of
“corruption” in a similar way. “Corruption, in the American
tradition, does not just include blatant bribes and theft from the
public till, but encompasses many situations when politicians
and public institutions serve private interests at the public’s
expense.”23
Was Bridgegate corruption? Not surprisingly, both Eisler
and Teachout reject a narrow, quid pro quo approach to
corruption.24 As they discuss, there are sharp divisions over the

20. See Brief for Petitioner at 6, Kelly, 140 S. Ct. 1565 (No. 18-1059), 2019
WL 4568203.
21. Eisler, supra note 12, at 1627.
22. Id. “The Court has committed to a particular theory of democracy that
refuses to impose the expectation that the public good should be the politicians’
primary concern.” Id. at 1642. At a certain level of generality, Eisler’s critique
can be applied to both campaign finance issues and ordinary corruption. The
question about how closely they are related is discussed below.
23. ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA 2 (2014).
24. See id. at 12; Eisler, supra note 12, at 1629.
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meaning of corruption.25 Bridgegate shows how the divisions
play out. If one focuses on using office for personal gain, the
conduct can be seen as hardball politics, but not more. The
political gain from harming the mayor does not seem to fit
within the classical narrow concept. Certainly, it is hard to see
a quid pro quo. Under a broader concept, however, Bridgegate
may be condemned as corrupt. Eisler favors a “civic approach”
based on the “expectation that the public good should be the
politician’s primary concern.”26 Bridgegate seems antithetical to
any such approach. Eisler discusses the concept of “institutional
corruption.”27 “Institutional corruption occurs when the duties
of public officers are abused not for explicitly private gain, but
in order to yield prohibited benefit (which does not accrue to the
official’s personal welfare).”28 Practices such as logrolling and
patronage are examples of other conduct that fit the broader
context. In sum, under one perspective, Bridgegate can certainly
be viewed as corruption.
2. Federal Law
Does this corruption violate federal law? It must be noted
at the outset that there is no general federal code of
anti-corruption law governing state and local government
officials. Nonetheless, anti-corruption prosecutions are an
important function of the Justice Department acting through
individual United States Attorneys.29 These prosecutions are
brought under a series of individual statutes that, taken
together, might be viewed as constituting a form of code. They
cover mainly extortion,30 bribery,31 and mail and wire fraud.32
None of these statutes leaps to mind in considering Bridgegate.
At various times there has existed a federal crime of deprivation
25. This debate is largely animated by Supreme Court decisions which
will be discussed infra Part III.
26. Eisler, supra note 12, at 1642.
27. Id. at 1630.
28. Id. at 1630–31 (discussing theories of Dennis Thompson).
29. See, e.g., NORMAN ABRAMS ET AL., FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
ENFORCEMENT 106–07 (7th ed. 2020).
30. 18 U.S.C § 1951 (2018).
31. Id. §§ 666, 1346.
32. Id. §§ 1341, 1343.
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of the right to honest services.33 Lower courts developed this
right by broadly construing the nature of “fraud” to include the
right to honest services. McNally v. United States34 brought the
doctrine to a halt. There is a background issue of separation of
powers in McNally, but the decision is best known for its
invocation of federalism. The Court warned against “the Federal
Government . . . setting standards of disclosure and good
government for local and state officials.”35 Congress overruled
McNally, and reinstated the honest services doctrine as within
the reach of fraud statutes.36 Bridgegate would have fit nicely
within it.37 However, the Supreme Court in Skilling v. United
States38 subsequently narrowed the scope of the doctrine to
bribery and kickbacks.39 The Court relied heavily on the
vagueness doctrine, and also cited McNally.40 The Court was,
once again, using approaches to statutory construction in order
to keep the federal judiciary from becoming an arbiter of good
government within the states. But these approaches were, in
part, based on the Constitution. Vagueness is one example.
However, a conceivable reading of Skilling is that development
of a criminally enforceable right to honest services is beyond the
power of the federal courts or the Congress.
Were these developments a rejection of a broad view of
corruption, or just statutory construction?41 Not surprisingly,
defendants’ amici in Kelly portrayed the prosecution as an
attempt to reintroduce honest services through the back door.42

33. See, e.g., ABRAMS, supra note 29, at 347–51.
34. 483 U.S. 350, 358–61 (1987).
35. Id. at 360.
36. See, e.g., ABRAMS, supra note 29, at 350–51.
37. See generally Sorich v. United States, 555 U.S. 1204 (2009) (Scalia,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (describing examples of the doctrine).
38. 561 U.S. 358 (2010).
39. See id. at 408–09 (“To preserve the statute without transgressing
constitutional limitations, we now hold that § 1346 criminalizes only the
bribe-and-kickback core of the pre-McNally case law.”).
40. See id. at 402 (citing McNally, 483 U.S. at 360).
41. Cf. TEACHOUT, supra note 23, at 195–99 (praising lower courts’
adoption of doctrine because of its breadth).
42. See generally Brief of the National Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Kelly v. United States, 140 S. Ct.
1565 (2020) (No. 18-1059), 2019 WL 4729854.
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Amici with the same perspective had played an influential role
in McDonnell v. United States.43 There, the defendant governor
set up meetings and performed other minor favors for a
would-be state contractor who had given him gifts. He was
convicted of bribery. However, the Supreme Court unanimously
rejected the notion that he had performed “official acts” on
behalf of the donor, a requirement of the statutes at issue.44 In
sum, on the eve of Bridgegate, one could read Supreme Court
doctrine as fundamentally hostile to honest services notions of
corruption, or constrained by the vagueness doctrine to reject it.
III. The Bridgegate Prosecution and the Saga in the Lower
Federal Courts
A. The Indictment and the Successful Prosecution
The unusual facts of Bridgegate presented the United
States Attorney for New Jersey with a dilemma. On the one
hand, the conduct looked corrupt—definitional niceties aside.
On the other hand, an honest services theory was not available.
Thus, he had to fall back on the array of statutes cited above, or
find another source of federal criminal law. Yet, many of the
criminal statutes rest on some form of quid pro quo, which
Bridgegate did not present. He obtained an indictment that
charged violation (and conspiracy to violate) of three federal
statutes: the Federal Program Bribery Statute,45 the Wire
Fraud Statute,46 and the Criminal Civil Rights Statute.47
The essence of the three statutory theories is as follows.
The Federal Program Bribery Statute—generally known as
§ 666—applies to officials of an entity that receives federal
43. See generally McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016).
Ironically, former Governor McDonnell himself joined in an amicus brief in
Kelly. See generally Brief for Amici Curiae Lord Conrad Black and Former
Governor Robert F. McDonnell in Support of Petitioner, Kelly, 140 S. Ct. 1565
(No. 18-1059), 2019 WL 1275301.
44. The concept of “official acts” derives from the definition of bribery in
18 U.S.C. § 201 (2018).
45. Id. § 666; Indictment at 1–29, United States v. Baroni, 2017 WL
1233892 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2017) (No. 2:15-CR-00193-SDW-1), https://perma.cc
/BVB7-4SMG (PDF).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 1343; Indictment, supra note 45, at 29–35.
47. 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242; Indictment, supra note 45, at 33–36.
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funding in certain instances, forbidding acts of bribery by such
officials.48 In addition, any such official violates the statute if he
or she “embezzles, steals, obtains by fraud, or otherwise without
authority knowingly converts to the use of any person other
than the official owner or intentionally misapplies, property (of
a certain description).”49 The prosecutor argued that property
could either be tangible or intangible, and that payments to
employees—and control of the bridge—qualified.
The wire fraud statute provides in part that “[w]hoever,
having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses . . . or promises [utilizes electronic
means]” shall be punished.50 Again, the prosecutor’s argument
was that the indictment sufficiently alleged “obtaining”
intangible property.51
The Criminal Civil Rights Statutes have not been widely
used in the anti-corruption context.52 The key statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 242, makes it a crime for a person acting under color of law to
“willfully subject any person in any State, Territory . . . to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or
protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.”53
The statute was arguably applicable because the defendants
had deprived Fort Lee residents of their constitutionally based
right to intrastate travel. The indictment survived a motion to
dismiss; the jury convicted on all counts. However, the judicial
saga had only begun. In particular, the prosecution had to worry
about the defense’s general claim that the indictment allowed a

48. 18 U.S.C. § 666.
49. Id. § 666(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
50. Id. § 1343 (emphasis added).
51. See United States v. Baroni, No. 2:15-CR-00193-SDW, 2016 WL
3388302, at *8 (D.N.J. June 13, 2016).
52. See George Brown, New Federalism’s Unanswered Question: Who
Should Prosecute State and Local Officials for Political Corruption?, 60 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 417, 490–91 (2003) (discussing use of criminal civil rights
statutes).
53. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2018).
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back-door version of an honest services prosecution to sneak in
through the property theories.54
B. The District Court Opinion: Ignoring the Supreme Court?
The lower court opinions are discussed at some length
because their differences illustrate the extensive flexibility of
the two major federal statutes involved.55 In denying
defendants’ motion to dismiss and motion for acquittal and for
a new trial, Federal District Judge Susan Wiggenton delivered
opinions that endorsed a broad federal role in combating state
and local corruption.56 Indeed, she seemed to ignore virtually
everything the Supreme Court has been saying since McNally.
Her main focus was on the meaning of “misapplies” in
§ 666.57 She read the statute as the equivalent of an honest
services provision. It refers to “any improper use of property,
whether or not for personal gain.”58 She noted that under Third
Circuit Model Jury Instructions misapplication “includes the
wrongful use of the money or property for an unauthorized
54. See Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Ms. Kelly’s
Motion to Dismiss the Indictment in Its Entirety at 33, Baroni, 2016 WL
3388302 (No. 2:15-CR-00193-SDW), 2016 WL 1579981
Like Cicco, Ms. Kelly’s argument is bolstered by the fact that had
Congress intended § 666 to cover the conduct here, it would not
have needed to enact the honest services statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1346,
four years later. Section 1346 was enacted in response to the
Supreme Court’s decision in McNally, which held that § 1341 was
not intended to protect intangible rights, only property rights.
McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987). Congress made clear
in § 1346 that it intended to include a ‘scheme or artifice to deprive
another of the intangible rights to honest services,’ which had been
interpreted, pre-Skilling, to cover just about any abuse of office by
a public official or employee.
55. Professor Torres-Spelliscy also discusses the two lower court
opinions. See Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Elegy for Anti-Corruption Law: How the
Bridgegate Case Could Crush Corruption Prosecutions and Boost Liars, 69 AM.
U. L. REV. 1689, 1698–1700 (2020).
56. See United States v. Baroni, No. 2:15-CR-00193-SDW, 2017 WL
787122 (D.N.J. Mar. 1, 2017) (denying defendants’ motions for judgments of
acquittal and motions for a new trial); Baroni, 2016 WL 3388302 (denying
defendants’ motions to dismiss).
57. 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A) (2018); see Baroni, 2016 WL 3388302, at
*3 – 6.
58. Baroni, 2016 WL 3388302, at *5.
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purpose.”59 She rejected the defendants’ vagueness argument on
the ground that the statute is “broad, but not unclear.”60 The
wire fraud convictions were upheld on the ground that “the
object of the alleged scheme or artifice to defraud must be a
traditionally recognized property right.”61 This could include
tangible property such as employee salaries as well as
intangible property. The court also upheld the civil rights
convictions.62
This is an extraordinary decision. It turns the
misapplication prohibition of § 666 into something close to a
general honest services statute. The jurisdictional trigger is
receipt by a jurisdiction of $10,000 in federal funds.63 Virtually
all state and local governments are covered. However, the
misapplication applies to all property whether acquired by
federal funds or not. Early arguments over § 666 focused on
whether it applies this sweepingly.64 The similarity in the
district court’s analysis to notions of honest services is striking.
It refers to “root[ing] out public corruption”65 and to motives like

59. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting THIRD CIRCUIT MODEL CRIMINAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS § 6.18.666A1A-3 (2017), https://perma.cc/9UL6-Y7GP (PDF)).
60. Baroni, 2016 WL 3388302, at *3 (citing the ruling on the motion to
dismiss indictments discussed supra note 56). She noted that even the
Supreme Court had described it as having “plain and unambiguous ‘meaning’
and ‘expansive unqualified language,’” Id. at *3–4 (citing Salinas v. United
States, 522 U.S. 52, 52, 57 (1997)). Salinas was decided 13 years before
Skilling accepted a vagueness argument in the “honest services” context.
61. Id. at *6.
62. See id. at *7–8. They were upheld on the ground that the right to
intrastate travel is sufficiently established. The court described at length the
defendants’ “illegitimate purpose of harming Fort Lee residents,” although it
had earlier stated that motive “is not an essential element of any of the crimes
charged.” Compare id. at *2, with id. at *7.
63. 18 U.S.C. § 666(b) (2018). In addition, the transaction at issue must
have a value of $5,000 or more. Id.
64. In Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004), the Supreme Court
held by implication that it does. The core rationale was that Congress wants
officials who handle its grants of money to be faithful servants of the public
trust, lest their unfaithfulness extends to the federal moneys. See id. at
605 – 06.
65. Baroni, 2017 WL 787122, at *4 (citing United States v. Willis, 844
F.3d 155, 165 (3d Cir. 2016)).
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“improper” or “wrongful use of property.”66 Whether regulatory
actions are a form of property is not addressed.
The decision would gladden the heart of anyone who
criticizes the Supreme Court for softness on corruption. It shows
a conception of the judicial role in this field similar to that
imagined by Professor Teachout: courts resolve corruption
issues, far beyond the boundaries of quid pro quo.67 Is the
district court ignoring the Supreme Court? Judge Wiggenton
was able to cite to the Court’s decision in Salinas v. United
States68 for the view that this statute is to be broadly
construed.69 Section 666 is presented by the district court as a
statute written for a broad purpose with language that is “broad
but not unclear.”70 Defendants are apparently on notice as to the
purpose of the statute as well as its text and court decisions
interpreting it.71
It is hard to reconcile this reasoning with the Supreme
Court’s general approach to vagueness.72 More importantly, it is
hard to reconcile the district court’s approach with the Court’s
repeated reluctance to involve the federal judiciary in devising
codes of conduct for state and local government.73 The district
court disposes of federalism in a footnote.74 Another footnote
distinguishes honest services rights from intangible property
rights by stating that the two are different.75 The
criminalization of politics argument is also discussed summarily

66. United States v. Baroni, No. 2:15-CR-00193-SDW, 2016 WL 3388302,
at *5 (D.N.J. June 13, 2016). The wire fraud portion of the opinion is also
broad.
67. See generally TEACHOUT, supra note 23 , at 231–34.
68. 522 U.S. 52 (1997).
69. See Baroni, 2016 WL 3388302, at *4 (citing Salinas, 522 U.S. at 57).
70. Baroni, 2016 WL 3388302, at *4.
71. See id.
72. See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 529–30 (2015) (narrow
construction of the word “object”); Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 859–60
(2014) (narrow construction of the Chemical Weapons Convention
Implementation Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-856 (1999)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.)).
73. See McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2373 (2016);
McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987).
74. See Baroni, 2016 WL 3388302, at *9, n.10.
75. See id. at *9, n.15.
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in a footnote.76 Had the case stopped here, the district court’s
opinion and decision would have stood as a sharp alternative to
what the Supreme Court has been doing and saying about the
federal anti-corruption enterprise.
C. The Third Circuit: Closer to the Supreme Court?
On appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
corruption convictions, but in a way that hewed somewhat more
closely to the Supreme Court’s overall view of the issue.77 The
court did uphold the wire fraud convictions. The two key points
reiterated the lower court’s analysis: property under the statute
can be intangible as well as tangible;78 and wages of Port
Authority personnel needed to carry out the scheme constitute
“a form of intangible property.”79
The most important part of the decision is its narrowing
of § 666. The Third Circuit was able to uphold that part of the
convictions under a much narrower theory than the district
court’s. The suggestion that “misapplication” might be stretched
to equal an honest services statute was put to rest. The objective
language of § 666 covers an official who “embezzles, steals,
obtains by fraud, . . . or intentionally misapplies” property of the
entity receiving federal funds.80 The circuit court read the verbs
as similar, all parts of a theft-like offense.81 Misapplication is to
be read narrowly, limiting § 666 to “theft, extortion, bribery, and

76. See id. at *4.
77. See generally United States v. Baroni, 909 F.3d 550 (3d Cir. 2018).
The Court rejected the constitutional argument based on a right to intrastate
travel. Id. at 585–89.
78. See id. at 564. The Third Circuit says that the property prong is met
by the intangible property of employee time and labor, as well as the Port
Authority’s “unquestionable property interest in the bridge’s exclusive
operation, including the allocation of traffic through its lanes and of the public
employee resources necessary to keep vehicles moving.” Id. at 567.
79. Id. at 565. The court did not decide the argument that the “right to
control” the bridge is a form of intangible property, but it indicated agreement
with it. Id. at 566–67. The Court of Appeals had no difficulty in fitting the wire
fraud counts within existing Supreme Court decisions.
80. 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1) (2018).
81. See Baroni, 909 F.3d at 570–76.
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similar corrupt acts.”82 The court could then apply its wire fraud
analysis of property to a case where the defendants
“fraudulently obtained, knowingly converted, or intentionally
misapplied the labor of Port Authority employees. . . .”83
The defendants argued that acting with a prohibited
interest would now constitute fraud if any government revenue
were used to make or effectuate the decision.84 The court flipped
the argument on its head by arguing that there could never be
“simple mail fraud or wire fraud” because “obtaining” would
always constitute dishonest services.85 Defendants attempted to
turn the § 666 debate into one about the criminalization of
politics. They argued the case amounted to a discretionary
allocation of public resources in the normal course of operations,
based on political concerns.86 The court stuck to its guns. Any
political dimensions concerned the defendants’ motive, which
was not an element of the offense.87 Even though § 666 was
aimed at preserving the “integrity”88 of recipients of federal
assistance, it did so by focusing on “offenses involving fraud and
theft. . . .”89 The court also considered a vagueness challenge to
the trial court’s use of “unjustifiable or wrongful” to define
misapplication.90 The court responded that “[j]urors are
regularly trusted to understand the meaning of these ordinary
words in criminal cases.”91
Both lower courts to a degree aimed their opinions at the
Supreme Court’s general approach to anti-corruption cases,
82. Id. at 574 (quoting United States v. Thompson, 484 F.3d 877 (7th Cir.
2007)).
83. Baroni, 909 F.3d at 574.
84. See id. at 568.
85. Id. at 569.
86. See id. at 571.
87. Overall, the court presented a defensible reason for treating this case
as property fraud rather than honest services. The Third Circuit’s treatment
of federalism is less satisfactory. The court dealt with it by ruling that the Port
Authority is “an interstate agency created by Congressional consent,” and that
it “receives substantial federal funding.” Id. at 569. This would suggest that
the decision is law only for the Authority and entities like it.
88. United States v. Baroni, 909 F.3d 550, 573 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting
Fischer v. United States, 529 U.S. 676, 678 (2000)).
89. Id. at 572.
90. Id. at 582.
91. Id. at 583.

DEFENDING BRIDGEGATE

157

although the district court seemed more concerned with evading
it rather than following it. They realized that Bridgegate had
substantial political overtones, and that the defendants were
relying heavily on the Court’s aversion to an honest services,
good government approach to the application of federal criminal
law to corruption cases. The district court dealt with the end run
argument, but only in a footnote.92 The circuit court squelched
the district court’s apparent attempt to achieve a form of honest
services through a broad reading of “misapplies” in § 666.93 Two
aspects of the lower court opinions seem odd, given that the
judges knew their handiwork was likely to face sharp scrutiny
in the Supreme Court. The first is the treatment of vagueness
as an easy question. If “honest” is an uncertain term,94 why
cannot the same be said of “misapply,” “wrongful” and
“unjustifiable?” Perhaps the Third Circuit made this problem go
away by reading “misapplication” as referring to a property
offense like theft or fraud. More serious was the cursory
treatment of federalism. The district court dealt with it in a brief
footnote. The Third Circuit finessed it by focusing on the
interstate nature of the Port Authority.
IV. Bridgegate in the Supreme Court: the Decision, the
Reaction, and the Implications for the Future of Federal
Anti-Corruption Law
A. The Decision: Kelly v. United States
At oral argument, the Supreme Court seemed puzzled
over whether the case involved good government or property.95
Justice Breyer questioned whether the issue was good
governance or property fraud. Justice Kagan’s analysis in the
actual opinion came down squarely on the latter side: “The

92. Id. at 568 (“Defendants were charged with simple money and
property fraud under Section 1343—not honest services fraud—and the grand
jury alleged an actual money and property loss to the Port Authority.”).
93. Id. at 574.
94. See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 422 (2010).
95. See, for example, pages 32 to 36 of the Transcript of Oral Argument,
Kelly v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1565 (2020) (No. 18-1059), https://perma.cc
/P3CK-3QA7 (PDF), in which Justice Breyer questions whether the issue is
good governance or property fraud.

158

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 141 (2020)

question presented is whether the defendants committed
property fraud.”96 Thus the case would seem to turn on whether
the Third Circuit was right in finding an “obtaining” of property
such as employee labor.
The Court apparently accepted the treatment of § 666 as
coextensive with the wire fraud statutes.97 This implicitly
ratifies the narrowing of a potentially broad statute. The
opinion also sounded a strong federalism note by quoting the
McNally passage that federal courts are not to “set standards of
disclosure and good government for local and state officials.”98
The Court repeated the theme that this limit is found in the
fraud statutes themselves, but it is clear that a broader,
constitutional imperative of federalism underlies this
construction. Congress’ attempt to enact an honest services law
has, in part, been limited by the Court on vagueness grounds.99
But, federalism concerns play a role in vagueness. The two
classic justifications for the vagueness doctrine are the need to
give citizens guidance and the need to prevent prosecutors from
exercising unchecked power.100 In corruption cases, that power
is exercised by federal prosecutors on state and local officials,
but we know that the federal government should not “use the
criminal law to enforce (its view of) integrity in broad swaths of
state and local policymaking.”101
This federalism-based approach did not mean the Third
Circuit was wrong in focusing on property. For the Supreme
Court, the problem was that the defendants’ scheme was not
“directed at the [Port Authority’s] property.”102 The court below
seemed trapped by the dilemma that every act of
maladministration can be recast as property fraud because
property can be found in the picture somewhere. The Supreme
Court escaped the dilemma by utilizing a different distinction.
96. Kelly, 140 S. Ct. at 1568.
97. See id. at 1571.
98. Id. (citing McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987)).
99. See Skilling, 561 U.S. at 405, 410.
100. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162
(1972).
101. Kelly, 140 S. Ct. at 1574 (citing Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S.
12, 24 (2000)).
102. Id. at 1572 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 44, Kelly, 140 S. Ct. 1565
(No. 18-1059), 2019 WL 6324152).
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The lane realignment was “a quintessential exercise of
regulatory power.”103 A regulatory choice is an example of
sovereign authority, not of government’s role as property
holder.104 This distinction may often not be easy to make. The
Court drew heavily on Cleveland v. United States,105 which
involved a fraudulent attempt to secure video poker licenses.
Certainly money was involved in administering the regulatory
scheme.106 The action in Bridgegate was a classic exercise of
sovereign power. The Court accepted that some property, such
as paid employee labor, was involved, but viewed it as incidental
to the scheme to redirect the lanes.107
One might accuse the Court of a somewhat old-fashioned
view of property as essentially a thing rather than as a set of
rights and duties. However, the Court is correct that “[m]uch of
governance involves (as it did here) regulatory choice.”108 Using
the fraud statutes widely to affect that governance would
seriously upset federalism values. Controlling state and local
governance presents the same question of ultimate sovereignty
as does “commandeering” them.109
B. The Reaction: More Roberts Court Encouragement of
Corruption?
In this subsection, I will discuss negative reactions to
Kelly, and place them in the larger context of the
“pro-corruption” critique of the Roberts Court.
Professor Torres-Spelliscy correctly viewed the oral
argument as portending a win for defendants.110 She criticized
the likely decision as an example of “the ever-escalating right to
103. Id. at 1572.
104. Id. at 1574.
105. 531 U.S. 12 (2000).
106. See id. at 15. The unused licenses had monetary value, but that value
was derivative of the regulatory freedom they conferred.
107. See Kelly v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1565, 1573–74 (2020).
108. Id. at 1574.
109. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997) (“Federal
commandeering of state governments is . . . a novel phenomenon.”).
110. See Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Will the Supreme Court Let the Bridgegate
Defendants Get Away with Lying?, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Feb. 24, 2020),
https://perma.cc/57SB-J54V.
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lie and the ever-shrinking definition of corruption.”111 The
notion of the Court as advancing a right to lie is a recurrent
theme of her writing.112 Presumably, this right’s principal base
is the Constitution.113 Whatever one thinks of this perspective,
a “right to lie” played little if any role in Justice Kagan’s opinion
for a unanimous Court. Her point was that what the defendants
did was not an “obtaining”; it was a “run-of-the-mine exercise of
regulatory power . . . .”114 The fact that they lied to help the
scheme did not change its nature. Lying is irrelevant, and
certainly not a “right” enumerated in Justice Kagan’s opinion.115
As for corruption, Professor Torres-Spelliscy has criticized
the Roberts Court for encouraging it. “Politicians who have been
charged with serious allegations of political corruption are using
the Supreme Court’s rebranding of corruption, including its lax
interpretation of what counts as corruption from both campaign
finance and criminal cases, to their legal advantage.”116 Like
Professor Teachout, Professor Torres-Spelliscy relies heavily on
campaign finance decisions such as Citizens United117 as
influencing and reflecting the Court’s view of what might be
called “ordinary corruption.”118 There are a number of excellent
analyses explaining the relationship and differences between
the two fields.119 Both can present questions of how
representative government works, and more general issues of
public-private interactions and the problem of private influence
on public officials. However, the automatic equating of the two
seems superficial. Elections almost always involve a flow of

111. Id. For other writings of Professor Torres-Spelliscy on Bridgegate, see
supra note 55 and accompanying text; Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, The Supreme
Court Considers Political Lies in the Bridgegate Case, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.
(Oct. 28, 2019), https://perma.cc/R2S5-SZZF.
112. See, e.g., CIARA TORRES-SPELLISCY, POLITICAL BRANDS 32–38 (2019).
113. See id. at 34–37.
114. Kelly, 140 S. Ct. at 1572–73.
115. Id. at 1572. Justice Kagan stated that “[b]ecause the scheme here did
not aim to obtain money or property, Baroni and Kelly could not have violated
the federal-program fraud or wire fraud laws.” Id. at 1574.
116. TORRES-SPELLISCY, supra note 112, at 5.
117. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
118. See TORRES-SPELLISCY, supra note 112, at 41–43; TEACHOUT, supra
note 23, at 7–12.
119. See, e.g., Eisler, supra note 12; Sellers, supra note 12.
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private money.120 Elected politicians campaign to the electorate
by appealing to one side over the other. However, the principles
of administration of the law—even by elected officials—start
with a presumption of neutrality, and view the flowing of things
of value to officials with great suspicion.121 I concede that there
is not a wall of separation. As Professor Torres-Spelliscy points
out, one can find echoes of Citizens United (campaign finance)
in McDonnell (ordinary corruption).122 Indeed, as she notes,
ordinary corruption defendants may cite Citizens United in
support of a loose view of the political process.123
A more fundamental critique of the positions of Professors
Torres-Spelliscy and Teachout is that they do not have much to
say about federalism. A central theme in the ongoing debate
over combating corruption has been the relative roles of the
federal and state governments. The debate has been robust,
particularly in academia. In a landmark article, Professor Peter
Henning pointed out the advantages of federal prosecution.124
He contended for example that “[c]orruption is not a matter
solely of state concern, reserved for the police powers of the
states, but is instead a national concern that falls within the
interests of the federal government.”125 Proponents of this view
have cited the political problem of state politicians prosecuting
their colleagues—who may, in the case of governors, have
appointed them126—and the federal government's superior
120. Except for public campaign financing.
121. The Supreme Court’s statement about the “impartial execution of the
laws” demonstrates these principles. See Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l. Ass’n. of
Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973).
122. See TORRES-SPELLISCY, supra note 112, at 60.
123. See id. at 60–62; see also George Brown, The Federal Anti-Corruption
Enterprise After McDonnell—Lessons from the Symposium, 121 PENN ST. L.
REV. 989, 990–98 (2017) (citing the role of amici in McDonnell).
124. See Henning, supra note 15, at 144.
125. Id. at 86. “Federalism protects states, and thereby individuals, from
oppression by the national government, but it does not permit public authority
to be exercised corruptly, harming both the state and its citizenry by
insulating non-federal officials from federal criminal prosecution.” Id.
126. For example, Christopher Porrino, who served as Governor Christie’s
Chief Counsel during the Bridegate scandal, was nominated and confirmed as
the state’s Attorney General two years after. Matt Arco, Christie Nominates
His Former Chief Counsel as N.J. Attorney General, NJ.COM (June 16, 2016),
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resources. The contrary view focuses on the existence of state
laws and the widespread use by state ethics commissions, as
well as traditional prosecution mechanisms.127 States, it is
argued, cannot fix their enforcement problems if they are never
given a chance in the important cases.128
Professor Torres-Spelliscy, of course, wrote before Kelly,
and cannot be blamed for failing to discuss the extensive
federalism underpinnings of the decision. However, cases such
as McNally and McDonnell had certainly shown the Court’s
concern for federalism in allocating prosecutorial roles. The
most prominent critic of the actual decision is Professor Leah
Litman.129 Writing in The Washington Post shortly after the
decision, she opined that Kelly had made it “almost impossible”
to prosecute corrupt politicians.130 Professor Litman repeats
many of the standard criticisms of the Roberts Court. There is
for example, the reliance on Citizens United as a key step in the
pro-corruption direction. McDonnell is cited as an example of
the Court’s laissez-faire attitude toward the subject. Professor

https://perma.cc/Q8F2-F25R (last updated Jan. 16, 2019). In Massachusetts,
there has been uncertainty over the roles of the Attorney General’s office and
the State Ethics Commission in handling a state police scandal. See Andrea
Estes, DA, Ex-Head of State Police Probably Violated the Law by Ordering
Arrest Report Altered, Panel Says, BOS. GLOBE, https://perma.cc/PUR4-TRK7
(last updated June 24, 2020). Such issues can take on a partisan dimension.
See Press Release, Massachusetts Republican Party, AG Healy: Rule of Law
Doesn’t Matter If You’re a Fellow Democrat (June 25, 2020), https://perma.cc
/8JTF-DPR7.
127. See Richard Messick, Law Profs: Stop the Overheated Rhetoric About
Bridgegate, GLOBAL ANTICORRUPTION BLOG (May 13, 2020), https://perma.cc
/H9WQ-PGY7.
128. See generally Moohr, supra note 15; see also George D. Brown, Carte
Blanche: Federal Prosecution of State and Local Officials After Sabri, 54 CATH.
U.L. REV. 403, 413 (2005) (discussing the views of Professor Roderick M. Hills,
Jr., that different levels of government have distinct political values, and
“these prosecutions could impose on non-federal governments federal
conflict-of-interest rules that are fundamentally inconsistent with the style of
democracy that flourishes at the non-federal level” (quoting Roderick M. Hills,
Jr., Corruption and Federalism: (When) Do Federal Criminal Prosecutions
Improve Non-Federal Democracy?, 6 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 113, 114 (2005))).
129. See Litman Op-ed, supra note 3; see also Leah Litman, The Supreme
Court Says Sorry, It Just Can’t Help With Political Corruption, THE ATLANTIC
(May 8, 2020), https://perma.cc/S9G9-D932.
130. Litman Op-ed, supra note 3.
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Litman does not really analyze Kelly. There is nothing about
federalism.
There is, however, a strong element of partisanship. After
citing Citizens United, Professor Litman notes that “[i]n other
decisions that divided the Court along ideological lines,
GOP-appointed justices invalidated laws designed to combat
public corruption.”131 But this is a good example of overreliance
on campaign finance law to analyze ordinary corruption. Kelly
is the latest in a line of cases that have been decided
unanimously, including McDonnell, Skilling, and Cleveland.
Some of the opinions have been written by liberal,
Democratic-appointed justices,132 including Kelly itself. It was
Justice Kagan who wrote that “not every corrupt act by state or
local officials is a crime.”133 Of such language Professor Litman
writes that “we have shielded officials from accountability and
made public corruption inevitable.”134 Along with the
partisanship, one finds some guilt by association. We learn from
Professor Litman that the law firm of Jones Day represented
both Governor McDonnell and the Bridgegate defendants, and
that it had “previously done some legal work for the
President.”135
Some of the analysis seems naive. Professor Litman
complains that juries are likely to favor officials in corruption
cases.136 This will come as news to former Governor
McDonnell,137 former New York Speaker Silver,138 and former
New York Senate Majority Leader Skelos.139 It also flies in the

131. Id.
132. For instance, Justice Ginsburg authored the Cleveland decision. See
generally Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12 (2000).
133. Kelly v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1565, 1574 (2020).
134. Litman Op-ed, supra note 3.
135. Id.
136. See id. (“Public officials may command more respect and receive more
indulgence than the average criminal defendant from jurors, who often
interpret conflicting evvidence in their favor.”).
137. See supra Part II.B.2.
138. See Benjamin Weiser, Sheldon Silver Is Convicted in 2nd Corruption
Trial, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2018), https://perma.cc/T5NM-VXW4.
139. Vivian Wang, Guilty, Again: Dean Skelos, Former Senate Leader, Is
Convicted of Corruption in Retrial, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2018), https://perma.cc
/A6KN-K9EZ.
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face of common sense, as well as academic research, suggesting
unfavorable public opinion toward possibly corrupt officials.140
At times, Professor Litman seems unfamiliar with the material.
After discussing McNally, she writes that “Congress has never
amended
the
mail
fraud
statute
to
prohibit . . . pernicious . . . public corruption . . . .” like that in
McNally.141 Congress did essentially that a year after McNally
when it enacted the Honest Services Statute.142 A
section-by-section analysis of the broader statute of which it was
a part states that it “overturns the decision in McNally v. United
States in which the Supreme Court held that the mail and wire
fraud statutes protect property but not intangible rights.”143 I
would not go so far as to call Professor Litman’s article “plain
nonsense.”144 However, if it is the best critics of the Court can
do, the current, federalism-based attitude towards corruption
seems in little danger.
The article did spark a useful debate in the pages of the
Global Anticorruption Blog.145 Richard Messick points out that
the Court’s lenient attitude toward corruption has not
prevented a high level of prosecutions.146 He also rejects the
ideological critique, noting that the Court has generally been
unanimous in this area.147 Indeed Justices Ginsburg and Kagan
140. See generally Christopher Robertson et al., The Appearance and the
Reality of Quid Pro Quo Corruption: An Empirical Investigation, 8 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 375 (Dec. 1, 2016).
141. Id.
142. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 § 7603, 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2018)
(“[T]he term ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ includes a scheme or artifice to
deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.”).
143. 134 CONG. REC. S17,360 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1988) (statement of Sen.
Biden).
144. See Messick, supra note 127 (stating that Professor Litman’s claim
that the Court’s pattern in corruption cases makes it “‘almost impossible to
put a crooked politician in jail.’ . . . is plain nonsense.” (quoting Litman Op-Ed,
supra note 3)).
145. See id.; see also Matthew Stephenson, The U.S. Supreme Court’s
Opinion in the “Bridgegate” Case: Some Quick Reactions, GLOBAL
ANTICORRUPTION BLOG (May 12, 2020) https://perma.cc/6ZRD-LFGY.
146. See Messick, supra note 127.
147. See Messick, supra note 127 (“That the decision was unanimous and
written by a member of the Court’s liberal wing are two of several clues in the
Court’s opinion showing it is no part of a Trump-inspired plot to legalize public
corruption.”).
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have written three opinions for a unanimous court.148 It is hard
to imagine the liberal, Democratic-appointed justices being
prominent parts of a sinister attempt to enshrine corruption.
There were dissenters in McNally, but it was Republican
appointees who dissented.149
Messick also defends an emphasis on federalism in
anti-corruption enforcement.150 This central element of Kelly is
all but ignored by critics of the Court’s “leniency.” There is a real
debate about this issue, but, for example Professor Teachout
does not discuss it in her book Corruption in America.151 The
critics’ automatic assumption is that the federal government is
the primary, if not the sole, locus of preventing state and local
corruption. As Messick points out, states have their own
enforcement mechanisms.152
Messick’s colleague, Professor Matthew Stephenson,
defends Professor Litman by arguing that state performance is
uneven.153 Professor Stephenson takes the nationalist side in
the debate discussed above. He contends that aggressive federal
enforcement remains necessary.154 The question whether states
148. See generally Kelly v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1565 (2020); Skilling
v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010); Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12
(2000).
149. See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 362–77 (1987) (Stevens,
J., dissenting, joined in part by O’Connor, J.).
150. See Messick, supra note 127
Professor Litman would have readers believe that federal
prosecutors are the only ones protecting citizens from corrupt, venal
state and local leaders. That is of course not true. All states, and
many cities and counties, have their own prosecutors. All but three
states have state-level ethics commissions; many cities . . . have one
as well, and if all these agencies can’t hold corruption in check,
there is always the ballot box.
151. She does discuss state anti-bribery efforts in the nineteenth century.
See TEACHOUT, supra note 23, at 113–19.
152. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
153. See Stephenson, supra note 145 (“[R]eliance on state law is
problematic, particularly in settings w[h]ere state prosecutors, and perhaps
state judges as well, are part of the same political machine as the corrupt
officials. There’s a reason that . . . federal prosecutors . . . have played a
central role in cleaning up state and local corruption.”).
154. See id. Messick agrees as to anti-bribery laws. See Messick, supra
note 127 (“I don’t disagree that historically aggressive federal enforcement of
the antibribery laws have been an important check on elected politicians and
their political machines.”).
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can police their own is at the heart of that debate. The cursory
conclusion that they can’t deserves further exploring. Take
Bridgegate, for example. New Jersey has a statute aimed at
maladministration.155 But the Governor appoints the Attorney
General. Would public opinion have forced him to act? Would
state legal processes have led to some device such as
appointment of a special prosecutor? We don’t know. Certainly
New Jersey’s political processes played a strong role. The
conspirators lost their jobs.156 Governor Christie’s state and
national standing was seriously damaged.157
In subsequent blog posts, Messick criticizes the role of the
other federal branches in the enactment and enforcement of the
broad anti-corruption laws.158 He contends that “[t]hose
genuinely interested in fighting corruption need to stop
denouncing the Court and focus their energies instead on [the
other] two branches of government.”159 I think this is
analytically sound, but unlikely to happen. No one will lose their
academic standing for criticizing the Roberts Court, especially
if it can be labeled pro-corruption and linked to the Trump
administration. Messick is certainly right in calling for scrutiny
of United States Attorneys. They are important political actors
in their states, even if largely unaccountable.160 Messick points
155. See generally N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:30-2 (West 2020).
156. See Kelly, 140 S.Ct. at 1571 (“The fallout from the scheme was swift
and severe. Baroni, Kelly, and Wildstein all lost their jobs.”).
157. See generally Amber Phillips, The Bridgegate Trial Is Over. So Is
Chris Christie’s Political Career, Probably, WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2016), https://
perma.cc/5DZF-MUKD. I concede that the ultimately unsuccessful federal
prosecution may have played a role in these developments, although I question
whether that is the function of the U.S. Attorney.
158. See Richard Messick, Where the Real Blame for Letting Bridgegate
Defendants Off Lies: Part I, GLOBAL ANTICORRUPTION BLOG (May 20, 2020)
https://perma.cc/8PH5-SDLV [hereinafter Real Blame Part I]; Richard
Messick, Where the Real Blame for Letting Bridgegate Defendants Off Lies:
Part II—the Congress, GLOBAL ANTICORRUPTION BLOG (June 3, 2020), https://
perma.cc/PQ63-RT97.
159. Real Blame Part I, supra note 158.
160. See Harvey A. Silverglate & Emma Quinn-Judge, Tawdry or Corrupt?
McDonnell Fails to Draw a Clear Line for Federal Prosecutions of State
Officials, 2016 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 189, 216 (2016), https://perma.cc/3FP3LWZN (PDF) (“The central question is whether we want a system where
federal prosecutors can act—with what comes close to a blank check—to
regulate state and local politics.”).
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to the problem of the United States Attorney who seeks
recognition through highly visible corruption prosecutions.161
Neither level of government is perfect. There is plenty of room
for federalism debates on this subject in the future.
Federalism
aside,
Messick
introduces
another
constitutional reason for questioning the extraordinary reach of
U.S. Attorneys: the Due Process Clause as embodied in the
vagueness doctrine.162 His focus is on the second value invoked
for the doctrine: reining in enforcement authorities.163 Thus, he
seems to point to an ideal world in which the federal government
would define its role more narrowly, and the states would
assume a larger one.
C. The Impact of Bridgegate
1. Practical Implications
The principal criticism of Kelly is that in its result and
larger context, it makes federal prosecutions of corruption more
difficult, if not virtually impossible.164 The criticism has been
leveled before. A good example is the reaction to McDonnell.165
In that case, a governor had accepted gifts from a person who
wished to do business with the state. The governor arranged a
number of introductions and, in general, showed support for the
donor’s product. There was no showing of pressure to buy it.
Under the relevant federal statute, the question was whether

161. See Messick, supra note 127.
I am afraid the chance to bring a high-profile corruption [charge]
too often brings into play career factors that blind some to the rule
of law issues. Rudy Giuliani’s decision while U.S. Attorney to
personally prosecute the Queens borough chief after wrest[l]ing the
case away from local prosecutors could serve as exhibit one.
162. Real Blame Part I, supra note 158.
163. See generally Sorich v. United States, 555 U.S. 1204, 1204–08 (2009)
(Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 166–67 (1972) (“Where the list of crimes is so
all-inclusive and generalized as the one in this ordinance, those convicted may
be punished for no more than vindicating affronts to police authority . . . .”).
164. See Litman Op-Ed, supra note 3.
165. McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016).
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the governor had performed “official acts.”166 A unanimous
Supreme Court vacated his conviction, reversing the two lower
courts that had upheld it.167 The Court reasoned that the
governor had not taken official action to help the donor.168 What
he had done fell within the general category of responsiveness
to constituents.169 The Court’s analysis of responsiveness in a
democratic system seemed analogous to language in Citizens
United. Critics and defense lawyers pounced on the decision. For
the former, it was an example of the complacent attitude
towards corruption discussed above. They saw it as calling into
question a large range of bribery convictions, present and
future. The lawyers began to use the case to attack existing
prosecutions. They enjoyed initial success. However, the
McDonnell boomlet fizzled. Federal courts found it
distinguishable, and routinely upheld convictions where it was
invoked.170 The tendency in bribery cases appears to be for
prosecutors to present enough evidence of a relation to an
“official action” to satisfy McDonnell.

166. See id. at 2361 (“To convict the McDonnells of bribery, the
Government was required to show that Governor McDonnell committed (or
agreed to commit) an ‘official act’ in exchange for the loans and gifts.”). The
honest services bribery statute, as it stands after Skilling, sends interpreters
to 18 U.S.C. § 201, which includes the requirement of “official acts.” See 18
U.S.C. § 201 (2018) (“[T]he term ‘official act’ means any decision or action on
any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controvery, which may at any
time be pending, or which may by be brought before any public official, in such
official’s official capacity, or in such official’s place of trust or profit.”).
167. See United States v. McDonnell, No: 3:14-CR-12, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 166390 (Dec. 1, 2014), aff’d 792 F.3d 478 (4th Cir. 2015), rev’d 136 S.
Ct. 2355 (2016).
168. See McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2375.
169. See id. at 2372 (“[C]onscientious public officials arrange meetings for
constitutents, contact other officials on their behalf, and include them in
events all the time. The basic compact underlying representative government
assumes that public officials will hear from their constituents and act
appropriately on their concerns . . . .”).
170. See, e.g., United States v. Stevenson, 660 F. App’x 4, 7 n.1 (2d Cir.
2016) (rejecting the argument raised by Stevenson appealing to McDonnell);
see also, e.g., DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN ET AL., ELECTION LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 805 (6th ed. 2017) (discussing post-McDonnell developments). Of
course, the converse can happen. Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992)
(providing an example of Supreme Court precedent that considerably opened
the door to increased anti-corruption prosecutions, at least initially).
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Kelly involves a different statute, but critics have already
labeled it as part of a pattern making it “almost impossible to
put a crooked politician in prison.”171 A question post-Kelly will
be how much official conduct is now shielded from mail and wire
fraud as an “exercise of sovereign power.”172 If the exercise
results in, or has as its object, personal gain, a court might hold
that any obtaining of property is not incidental. Then it would
be reachable if the case involved fraud and use of the mail or
wires. A frequent hypo in the various stages of the case involved
a mayor directing how snow is to be plowed.173 Apparently, if
she directs the crews to begin with neighborhoods that support
her politically, that is an exercise of sovereign power. If,
however, she directs that her own home be plowed first, that is
an example of personal gain, and thus an obtaining of
property.174
Such lines may be hard to draw. Conceptually, she derives
gain from seeing her supporters rewarded. Courts will face a
number of fine distinctions. The problem stems from the fact
that exercises of sovereign power often necessarily involve
municipal property. The city owns the snowplows, and the
wages paid to the driver can be viewed as property.175 For
line-drawing purposes, the Kelly Court postulated a distinction
between scheming to influence a regulatory choice and a scheme
to defraud the government of its property.176 Drawing on
Cleveland, the Court treated as fundamental the difference
171. Litman Op-Ed, supra note 3.
172. Kelly v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1565, 1572 (2020) (“The defendant’s
fraud ‘implicate[d] the Government’s role as sovereign’ wielding ‘traditional
police powers’—note its role ‘as property holder’” (quoting Cleveland v. United
States, 531 U.S. 12, 23–24 (2000))).
173. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 10–11, 36–40, Kelly v. United
States, 140 S. Ct. 1565 (2020) (No. 18-1059), https://perma.cc/P3CK-3QA7
(PDF).
174. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Kelly, 140 S. Ct. 1565. For
general discussions of such problems, see Kelly, 140 S. Ct. at 1573–74;
(describing fact scenarios sufficient to raise a loss of property to the
government used in a scheme to defraud); Baroni, 909 F.3d at 571 (discussing
the snowplower example).
175. See Kelly, 140 S. Ct. at 1572 (“By contrast, a scheme to usurp a public
employee’s paid time is one to take the government’s property.”).
176. See id. (“And this Court has already held that a scheme to alter such
a regulatory choice is not one to appropriate the government’s property.”).
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between “property and regulatory power.” However, this
formulation may not help much in a case where both are
present. As further guidance, the Court’s analysis suggests two
questions: whether any property loss or use is “only an
incidental byproduct of the scheme,”177 and whether the
scheme’s “object . . . was to obtain the [government]’s money or
property.”178
It seems likely that use of the mail and wire fraud
statutes will not be seriously curtailed by the decision.179 Basic
fraud like embezzling money will clearly be covered.180 Where
Kelly may have an effect is cases at the margin—when the role
of any property is not significant—and cases that look like
attempts to restore an honest services doctrine. More generally,
it will be interesting to see if lower courts (finally) get the
message that the Supreme Court wants them to approach
federal anti-corruption prosecutions of state and local officials
more cautiously.
2. Theoretical Dimensions of Bridgegate
Unlike some of the earlier decisions, Kelly does not rely on
such statutory construction doctrines as vagueness181 or the rule
of lenity.182 Two closely related concerns play a major role in the
177. Id. at 1572. “Or put differently, a property fraud conviction cannot
stand when the loss to the victim is only an incidental byproduct of the
scheme.” Id. (citing Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 23 (2000)).
178. Id. at 1568.
179. See Teachout tweet, supra note 10.
180. See Kelly, 140 S. Ct. at 1573 (providing an example of outright
embezzlement as constituting property fraud (citing Pasquantino v. United
States, 544 U.S. 349, 357 (2005))).
181. See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 368 (2010) (“In
proscribing fraudulent deprivations of ‘the intangible right of honest services,’
Congress intended at least to reach schemes to defraud involving bribes and
kickbacks. Construing the honest-services statute to extend beyond that core
meaning, we conclude, would encounter a vagueness shoal.” (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 1346 (2018))).
182. See Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 25 (2000) (“[T]o the
extent that the word ‘property’ is ambiguous as placed in § 1341, we have
instructed that ‘ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be
resolved in favor of lenity.’” (citing Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812
(1971))). United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal. is a well-known
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Kelly decision: (1) the desire to avoid turning a broad federal
statute into an honest services mandate; and, (2) general
principles of federalism. The rise and fall of the honest services
doctrine has been frequently detailed.183 The focus here is on
what has been animating the Court’s insistence that no such
doctrine can be derived from the mail and wire fraud statutes.
McNally’s disapproval of involving “the federal government in
setting standards of disclosure and good government for local
and state officials”184 has been repeated and paraphrased in
subsequent Supreme Court decisions curbing the federal role in
prosecuting ordinary corruption.185 McNally itself might be
explained in separation of powers terms. The notion of an
intangible right to honest public services, federally mandated by
the fraud statutes, began in the lower courts.186 It lasted for
forty years as a sort of federal common law of corruption.187 One
can question whether this is a proper role for the courts. Richard
Messick puts forward a different separation of powers
argument: unbounded freedom to dictate what is good
government vests too much power in federal prosecutors.188
Justice Scalia raised this issue in his influential dissent from
the denial of certiorari in Sorich.189

example of strict statutory construction in the anti-corruption context. See
generally 526 U.S. 398 (1999). The Court read the federal anti-gratuities
statute narrowly. Professor Teachout, however, sees it as something more,
reflecting a "deep logic of politics . . ." and encouraging the use of money to
purchase influence. TEACHOUT, supra note 23, at 228–29.
183. E.g., ABRAMS, supra note 29, at 347–50.
184. McNally, 483 U.S. at 360.
185. E.g., Kelly v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1565, 1571 (2020); McDonnell
v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2373 (2016); Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 20.
186. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
187. See United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 139–44 (2d. Cir. 1982)
(Winter, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
188. See Messick, supra note 127.
189. See Sorich v. United States, 555 U.S. 1204, 1206 (2009) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari)
Without some coherent limiting principle to define what ‘the
intangible right of honest services’ is, whence it derives, and how it
is violated, this expansive phrase invites abuse by
headline-grabbing prosecutors in pursuit of local officials, state
legislators, and corporate CEOs who engage in any manner of
unappealing or ethically questionable conduct.

172

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 141 (2020)

After Kelly, the question arises whether there will be a
resurgence of the critique of the federal role and how far it might
extend. Messick argues federal intervention is proper in cases of
bribery.190 This raises the old question of what sort of cases
warrant federal intervention.191 But suppose the argument for a
limit is constitutionally based, and points to no intervention. If
state and local governance is protected from federal
commandeering,192 why doesn’t the protection extend to
oversight of how that governance is exercised? On the other
hand, is it significant that the Kelly Court did not discuss more
general principles of constitutional federalism as discussed and
debated in cases such as Printz v. United States, United States
v. Lopez and Younger v. Harris?193
Much of the problem stems from the fact that the
Constitution does not contain a general anti-corruption clause
granting Congress the power to deal with the issue. Professor
Kurland has argued that the Guarantee Clause194 is a clear
constitutional foundation for the anti-corruption enterprise and
acts as a grant of power to enact appropriate statutes.195 This
argument has force, but does not seem to have attracted wide
support. Professor Teachout finds in the Foreign Emoluments
Clause,196 an anti-corruption imperative for the whole
190. E.g., Messick, supra note 158.
191. E.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Corruption and Federalism: (When) Do
Federal Criminal Prosecutions Improve Non-Federal Democracy, 6
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 113, 138 (2005).
192. E.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 898 (1997).
193. See id.; United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 575–83 (1995)
(Kennedy, J., concurring); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44–45 (1971). It
may be that the field of corruption should not be seen as one which is largely
forbidden to Congress because of principles of federalism. Instead, those
principles drive the Court to an exceedingly grudging and narrow reading of
the statutes that purport to criminalize corruption.
194. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to
every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government . . . .”).
195. See Adam H. Kurland, The Guarantee Clause as a Basis for Federal
Prosecutions of State and Local Officials, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 367, 415–70 (1989)
(articulating the argument for the Guarantee Clause’s basis for federal
jurisdiction for anti-corruption measures).
196. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (“[N]o Person holding any Office of
Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress accept
of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any
King, Prince, or foreign State.”).
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country.197 While one can perhaps extract a hortatory message,
it is hard to see the clause as a grant of power to Congress to
deal with state and local corruption.
How is it, then, that virtually every week sees a prominent
state or local official in the federal dock on corruption charges?
As noted earlier, an array of federal statutes reach, or have been
construed to reach, corrupt activity. Congress' power to enact
them derives from specific authority granted in the
Constitution, for example, the Commerce Clause, the Postal
Power, or the Spending Power.198 The Hobbs Act, for example,
punishes extortion, defined as the obtaining of property from
another “with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or
threatened force . . . or under color of official right.”199 “[C]olor
of official right” sounds like it might extend to corrupt
politicians, but where does Congress get the power to
criminalize such obtaining in the first place? The answer is that
the perpetrator must be someone who “in any way or degree
obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any
or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion . . . .”200 The
Act is in some tension with notions of federalism that the Court
developed in different contexts.201 True, the statutory language
is broad, and the Court has said that it is to be broadly
construed.202 However, the federalism concerns that have
recently become dominant might cause the Court to tighten up
interpretation. Lower courts may be seen to have gone too far in
holding that “an actual impact on commerce is sufficient if it is
small or even ‘de minimis.’”203

197. See TEACHOUT, supra note 23, at 26–28 (discussing adoption of Clause
and the Framers’ intent). Professor Henning had sounded many of the same
notes in his landmark article. See Henning, supra note 15, at 83–89
(discussing anti-corruption legacy of the Constitution).
198. See ABRAMS, supra note 29, 21–30.
199. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (2018).
200. Id. § 1951(a).
201. See Henning, supra note 15, at 76–84 (arguing that notions of a
separate state sphere do not apply to fighting corruption).
202. See Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215 (1960) (“Th[e Hobbs]
Act speaks in broad language, manifesting a purpose to use all the
constitutional power Congress has to punish interference ‘in any way or
degree.’” (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2018))).
203. ABRAMS, supra note 29, at 316.
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Jurisdictional elements like those in the Hobbs Act are
potential targets for reducing the reach of federal statutes used
to pursue corruption. There is, of course, the question whether
they measure the federal interest better than substantive
elements. Either way, we are back to identifying when federal
intervention is justified. Federalism post-Kelly may play a
bigger role in answering that question. The issue is not limited
to the Hobbs Act. The mail and wire fraud statutes require that
these means of communication be a part of the scheme to
defraud “for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice.”204
Supreme Court decisions have taken a broad approach to this
requirement.205 Again, emphasis on federalism might lead to a
different approach. Recently, the First Circuit found this
element lacking in a complex patronage scheme. It involved fake
examinations, in cases where the successful applicant had
already been chosen. Unsuccessful candidates received letters
informing them of the results. The circuit court held the mailing
was not an essential part of the scheme.206
Section 666—a fraud statute not tied to the Commerce
Clause—was enacted pursuant to the Spending Power, and is
triggered by a jurisdiction's receipt of a certain amount of
federal funds.207 Congress' purpose was to protect federal funds.
However, the Supreme Court has allowed its application to
activity in the funded entity not connected to federal funds. Here
too, an emphasis on federalism could lead the Court to a
different result.208 Apart from specific statutes, general

204. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2018).
205. See, e.g., Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 710–11 (1989) (“To
be part of the execution of the fraud, however, the use of the mails need not be
an essential element of the scheme. It is sufficient for the mailing to be
‘incident to an essential part of the scheme,’ or ‘a step in [the] plot . . . .” (citing
Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954))); Badders v. United States, 240
U.S. 391, 394 (1916))); ABRAMS, supra note 29, at 347–51.
206. United States v. Tavares, 844 F.3d 46, 59 (1st Cir. 2016).
207. 18 U.S.C. § 666.
208. See Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 613 (2004) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (arguing that the broad scope of the
statute did not justify the broad interest in prosecuting the instance of
corruption).
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statements of “Principles of Federal Prosecution” might be
narrowed.209
It is possible that such questions will remain academic, in
the pejorative sense of the word. Still, federalism is always on
the table, and we live in an era when states are flexing their
muscles in areas as diverse as epidemic control, immigration,
and police reform.210 Intergovernmental relations are
undergoing extraordinary change in many areas, why not here?
V. Conclusion
In a term that featured blockbuster decisions and banner
headlines,211 Bridgegate flew under the radar. However, the
decision is of potentially great significance. The narrow
holding's reach is far from clear.212 The theoretical implications
could be sweeping. The Court repeatedly invoked federalism,
sending a message to lower courts and prosecutors to the effect
of “we really mean it.” Two implications stand out. The first,
albeit implicit, is that the Court sees ordinary corruption as
sometimes presenting different problems from campaign
finance. In Kelly itself, the Court did not cite Citizens United in
the opinion; it was not mentioned in oral argument and neither
party cited it in their brief.213 Some critics seem to posit a

209. See ABRAMS, supra note 29, at 235 (discussing the role of such
principles).
210. See generally, e.g., Stella Burch Elias, The New Immigration
Federalism, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 703 (2013); Nicole St. Clair Knobloch, Opinion,
Governors Can Lead the Way on Climate Too, BOS. GLOBE (May 9, 2020, 1:08
PM), https://perma.cc/JLJ4-9495.
211. See, e.g., President is Not ‘Above the Law,” Justices Decides, N.Y.
TIMES (July 10, 2020), https://perma.cc/FKG4-7S9X (PDF); Adam Liptak,
Supreme Court Rules Trump Cannot Block Release of Financial Records, N.Y.
TIMES (July 9, 2020), https://perma.cc/564X-H2EV (last updated July 10,
2020).
212. See Teachout tweet, supra note 10. Teachout continues to criticize the
holding.
213. Senator Sheldon Whitehouse in amicus supporting the government
cited it multiple times. Brief for Amicus Curiae Senator Sheldon Whitehouse
in Support of Respondent, United States of America at 17 n.6, Kelly, 140 U.S.
1565 (No. 18-1059). Whitehouse’s main point appears to be that Citizens
United, “caused democratic safeguards to rot from within, and it left the
People with less voice, less power, and more cynical than ever.” Id. at 17–18.
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monolithic Roberts Court view of corruption in all contexts.214
However, a categorical view may go too far; a more nuanced
approach is called for. There are, no doubt, as Eisler points
out,215 similarities between campaign finance and ordinary
corruption decisions. Outcomes in each area may reflect the
Court's underlying view of governance. At some level, one can
perhaps draw useful comparisons, but the level is an extremely
high one. For example, there are reasons why campaign finance
cases often split five-to-four, while Kelly was unanimous.
Campaign finance cases are dominated by First Amendment
issues and questions of the nature of corruption. Federalism
plays no role. In ordinary cases federalism—and potentially
related issues such as vagueness—are dominant, especially if
state and local officials are involved. This fact leads to the
second implication. Decisions such as Kelly could give
substantial impetus to a rethinking of the American
anti-corruption model which places United States Attorneys at
the forefront of prosecutions of state and local corruption. It is
admittedly difficult to visualize how this rethinking would play
out, and what results it would yield.216 For example, would the
federal role simply come to an end? This is doubtful. On the
other hand, there are plenty of opportunities to narrow it. The
extent to which federalism is a significant constitutional
214. See TEACHOUT, supra note 23, 9–10, 244–45; see also Ciara
Torres-Spelliscy, Deregulating Corruption, 13 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 471, 505
(2019) (“Politicians who have been charged with serious allegations of political
corruption are using the Supreme Court’s reduction of what counts as
corruption from both the campaign finance and the criminal cases to their
legal advantage.”).
215. See Eisler, supra note 12, at 1626 (“Though the doctrinal questions
may differ, the shared issue of representative obligation means a failure to
reconcile the treatment of governance between campaign finance law and
official corruption law will inevitably create tensions.”).
216. Professor Eisler suggests that
State (and local) anti-corruption law designed along civic lines may
offer a more promising possibility [than the Court's approach]. Such
laws could adopt the broad drafting and flexible enforcement
necessary to robustly encourage public-mindnedness, with the
additional benefit of greater intimacy between state government
and their smaller, geographically compact constituencies. While
there would be variance between state laws, this would reflect local
norms and enable “laboratories of democracy.”
Eisler, supra note 12, at 1688 (citations omitted).
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principle or a canon of construction is an important question.
Kelly leads to this kind of questioning and rethinking. For this
reason, it should be celebrated, rather than denigrated as some
bastard offspring of Citizens United.217

217. Kelly is helpful in pondering these issues, raised by scholars such as
Professors Eisler and Hills. Although I have generally leaned toward the
federalism position, I admit that I have at times found the nationalist
approach appealing, particularly the idea of the national government as the
beacon of civic integrity for the entire country. In recent years, this approach
has somewhat lost its luster.

